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Thursday, March 13, 2008
Friday, March 7, 2008
Circular Reasoning? Thoughts on Lukacs' Notion of Class Consciousness
In his History and Class Consciousness, Georg Lukacs attempts to reemphasize Marxism's Hegelian origin and redeem dialectics from attacks of revisionism. Opposing Kantian metaphysics, which makes an arbitrary difference between thing and thing-in-itself, the dialectic is supposed to be a relative dynamic between opposite ideas; in addition, it is supposed to be praxis, or unified thoughts and action. Consciousness is a dialectical notion: it is supposed to be "practical critical activity" with the task of "changing the world" (78). Class consciousness, in addition, "approaches society from another world and leads from the false path it has followed back to the right one" (78). In order to bring historical movement, the proletariat must organize itself and realize its own class consciousness.
This reading of class consciousness, while recognizing its aim for praxis, nonetheless place it primarily in the realm of thought. Even though upon realization of class consciousness action towards revolution must be on the way, the class consciousness itself does not quite contain action yet. This reading suggests that the realization of class consciousness is the exact moment that the thought is leading towards action; and, by virtue of its transition, class consciousness contains both thoughts and action. That which comes before class consciousness is either false consciousness or political unconsciousness; that which comes after consciousness--well, I think orthodox Marxism calls it revolution.
However, an opposing interpretation challenges this reading. It states that realization of class consciousness is revolution already because the proletariat class has already recognized its condition, and changes are already made in thoughts. To this point I object: where forth is praxis, that which unites thought and action? Defenders of this reading replies that because class consciousness is already defined as "thought and action", the realization of such fulfills the dialectics of praxis. But isn't this logic circular? Class consciousness is both thought and action, hence realizing it fulfills both thought and action. This interpretation seems to reduce class consciousness into a mere game of semantics, making it no more than a play of definitions. The condition of the proletariat does not change; perhaps it can imagine its socioeconomic condition changed--but usually we call that "false consciousness".
If we are to talk about Marxism, I think it would be for the best that we stay within its historical materialist framework. And perhaps our critique of it should come from historical perspective as well. For example: why the proletariat? Reliance on this particular class by today's standard seems absurd. Even in Marx's, or perhaps later, in Lukacs' time, such a class would be unable--too uneducated to understand the meaning of alienation, of fetishism, and of class consciousness--to carry out anything on its own. It is merely a reified object to the Marxist intellectuals and politicians, whom, symbolizing thought, required an outlet for action. What of subject-object relations and praxis? Well, I believe that in Hellenic Athens a group of professionals named sophists often taught their disciples ways of deceiving and taking advantage of others through the art of speech.
This reading of class consciousness, while recognizing its aim for praxis, nonetheless place it primarily in the realm of thought. Even though upon realization of class consciousness action towards revolution must be on the way, the class consciousness itself does not quite contain action yet. This reading suggests that the realization of class consciousness is the exact moment that the thought is leading towards action; and, by virtue of its transition, class consciousness contains both thoughts and action. That which comes before class consciousness is either false consciousness or political unconsciousness; that which comes after consciousness--well, I think orthodox Marxism calls it revolution.
However, an opposing interpretation challenges this reading. It states that realization of class consciousness is revolution already because the proletariat class has already recognized its condition, and changes are already made in thoughts. To this point I object: where forth is praxis, that which unites thought and action? Defenders of this reading replies that because class consciousness is already defined as "thought and action", the realization of such fulfills the dialectics of praxis. But isn't this logic circular? Class consciousness is both thought and action, hence realizing it fulfills both thought and action. This interpretation seems to reduce class consciousness into a mere game of semantics, making it no more than a play of definitions. The condition of the proletariat does not change; perhaps it can imagine its socioeconomic condition changed--but usually we call that "false consciousness".
If we are to talk about Marxism, I think it would be for the best that we stay within its historical materialist framework. And perhaps our critique of it should come from historical perspective as well. For example: why the proletariat? Reliance on this particular class by today's standard seems absurd. Even in Marx's, or perhaps later, in Lukacs' time, such a class would be unable--too uneducated to understand the meaning of alienation, of fetishism, and of class consciousness--to carry out anything on its own. It is merely a reified object to the Marxist intellectuals and politicians, whom, symbolizing thought, required an outlet for action. What of subject-object relations and praxis? Well, I believe that in Hellenic Athens a group of professionals named sophists often taught their disciples ways of deceiving and taking advantage of others through the art of speech.
Thursday, March 6, 2008
Berstein, Revisionism and Hauntology
When the term "revisionism" first appeared in Eduard Bernstein's work Evolutionary Socialism, it lacked its latter stigma as any form of deviance to an arbitrarily established "orthodoxy" of Marxism. Had Bernstein lived, he would have rejected with disgust Mao's calling of Khrushchev "revisionist" and other abuses of his term.
Is Bernstein's revisionism truly "revisionist" by its later attribution? The answer is clear: Bernstein would disagree with Mao by stating that Khrushchev's thaw and destalinization was not enough. Only a genuine move away from Communist ultimate goal and violent means of achieving for parliamentary socialism would suffice the burden of the term "revisionist". Revisionism, in its philosophical grounds, further represents the move away from Hegelian dialectics for Kantianism. Bernstein undermines the theory of value that Marxist creates in Das Kapital. As an associate of Marx and a close friend (and one of the two literary trustee) of Engels, then, Bernstein had truly disowned the original foundation of Marxism.
The historical reception of Bernstein, however, is dim; he was criticized immediately by orthodox Marxists of his time--most famously by Sparticist Rosa Luxemburg, who called him the first of Marxist "opportunists". His "revisionism" was often mentioned as a label against political enemies while his positive contribution to Marxism to call for self-examination: "the further development and elaboration of the Marxist doctrine must begin with criticism of it" (Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 25). His reception outside of Marxism fared no better. Even though European democratic socialist parties in practice followed many of Bernstein's points, they find Bernstein perhaps too tainted by his associations with Marx and Engels for orthodoxy. Had Bernstein been less practical and more capable of producing a sound theoretical work of his own, perhaps he would have found better receptions.
Of course, one must not forget that in the post-Marxist world, the specter of Marx (and his followers, critiques, friends and enemies) lives. Derrida's hauntology found its way even into Marx's prodigal son, Eduard Bernstein. When Bernstein's spirit was invoked by Xie Tao in his famed article last February in support of Chinese adoption of Democratic Socialism, would it know that through such invocation Luxemburg's criticism of Bernsteinian "opportunism" was again conjured into existence as well? Perhaps, instead of criticizing Xie Tao's citation of Bernstein as an anachronism, we can see this act in the light of huantology and accepted our fate that the haunt is long from over.
Is Bernstein's revisionism truly "revisionist" by its later attribution? The answer is clear: Bernstein would disagree with Mao by stating that Khrushchev's thaw and destalinization was not enough. Only a genuine move away from Communist ultimate goal and violent means of achieving for parliamentary socialism would suffice the burden of the term "revisionist". Revisionism, in its philosophical grounds, further represents the move away from Hegelian dialectics for Kantianism. Bernstein undermines the theory of value that Marxist creates in Das Kapital. As an associate of Marx and a close friend (and one of the two literary trustee) of Engels, then, Bernstein had truly disowned the original foundation of Marxism.
The historical reception of Bernstein, however, is dim; he was criticized immediately by orthodox Marxists of his time--most famously by Sparticist Rosa Luxemburg, who called him the first of Marxist "opportunists". His "revisionism" was often mentioned as a label against political enemies while his positive contribution to Marxism to call for self-examination: "the further development and elaboration of the Marxist doctrine must begin with criticism of it" (Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, 25). His reception outside of Marxism fared no better. Even though European democratic socialist parties in practice followed many of Bernstein's points, they find Bernstein perhaps too tainted by his associations with Marx and Engels for orthodoxy. Had Bernstein been less practical and more capable of producing a sound theoretical work of his own, perhaps he would have found better receptions.
Of course, one must not forget that in the post-Marxist world, the specter of Marx (and his followers, critiques, friends and enemies) lives. Derrida's hauntology found its way even into Marx's prodigal son, Eduard Bernstein. When Bernstein's spirit was invoked by Xie Tao in his famed article last February in support of Chinese adoption of Democratic Socialism, would it know that through such invocation Luxemburg's criticism of Bernsteinian "opportunism" was again conjured into existence as well? Perhaps, instead of criticizing Xie Tao's citation of Bernstein as an anachronism, we can see this act in the light of huantology and accepted our fate that the haunt is long from over.
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